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TOPIC

III.

BOMBARDMENT BY NAVAL FORCES.

What changes should be made in the Hague convention concerning bombarrlment by naval forces in time of
war~

1

(a) Should paragraph 2 of article 1 be omitted on the
ground that mines constitute a defense~
(b) As ahnost any vessel may no'v be converted into a
vessel of use in 'var, how 'vould paragraph 1 of article 2
apply~

(c) vYhat 'vould constitute "military necessity" under
paragraph 3 of article 2 ~
(d) Should article 3 be retainrd ~
• IX. ConYention concerning bombardment by na•al forces in time of war.
His Majesty the German Emperor, King of Prussia, etc.
[List of Heads of States.]
Animated by the desire to realize the wish expressed by the First Peace Conference
respecting the bombardment by naval forces of undefended ports, towns, and villages;
'Vhereas it is expedient that bombardments by naval forces should be subject to
rules of general application which would safeguard the rights of the inhabitants and assure the presenTation of the more important buildings, by applying as far as possible to
this operation of war the principles of the Regulation of U\99 respecting the Laws and
Customs of Land 'Var; ·
Actuated, accordingly, by the desire to ser•e the interests of humanity and to
diminish the seYerity and disasters of war;
Have resolved to conclude a ConYention to this effect, and haYe, for this purpose, ap·
pointed the following as their Plenipotentiaries:[Names of Plenipotentiaries.]
'Vho, after depositing their full powers, found in good and due form, ha•e agreed
upon the following provisions:CHAPTER

I.- The Bombardment of Undefended Ports, Towns, Villages, Dwellings, or
Buildings.
ARTICLE

I.

The bombardment by naYal forces of undefended ports, tov·:ns, \·illages, dwellings,
or buildings is forbidden.
A place cannot be bombarded solely because automatic submarine contact mines are
anchored off theharbor.
ARTICI.E II.
Military works, military or naYal establishments, depOts of arms or war materiel,
workshops or plant which could be utilized for the needs of the hostile fleet or army,
and the ships of war in the harbour. are not, however, included in this prohibition.
The commander of a naval force may destroy them with artillery, after a summons
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CONCJ. .USION.

(a) Paragraph 2 of articlo 1 should not be accepted in
its present form.
(b) Under the present rules in regard to conversion,
the presence in a balligerent port of vessels which are
suited for conversion into vessels of 'var may be a sufficient ground for bombardment unless satisfactory
arrangements are made to guaranty that these vessels
shall not be used for war purposes.
(c) ~iilitary necessity under paragraph 3 of article 2
applies to actions immediatel~r "indispensable for securing the ends of the war, and 'vhich are Ia,vful according
to modern law and usages of war" and not of a nature
"to make the return to peace unnecessarily difficult."
(d) Unless the wholo of Convention IX is revised,
article 3 in regar(l to requisitions by naval forces should
be retained.
followed by a reasonable delay, if all other means are impossible, and when the local
have not themselves destroyed them within the time fixed.
He incurs no responsibility for any unavoidable damage which may be caused by a
bombardment under such circumstances.
If military necessity demanding immediate action permits no delay, it is understood
that the prohibition to bombard the undefended town holds good, as in the case given in
paragraph 1, and that the commander shall take all requisite measures in order that
the town may suffer as little harm as possible.
authoritie~

ARTICLE

Ill.

After explicit notice has been given, the bombardment of undefended ports, towns,
villages, dwellings, or buildings may be proceeded with, if the local authorities, after a
formalsummonshas been made to them, decline to comply with requisitions for provisions or supplies necessary for the immediate needs of the naval force before the
place in question.
.
These requisitions shall be in proportion to the resources of the place. They shall
only be demanded in the name of the commander of the said naval force, and they
shall, as far as possible, be paid for in cash; if not, they shall be acknowledged by
receipts.
ARTICLE

IV.

The bombardment of undefended ports, towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings on
account of failure to pay money contributions is forbidden.
CHAPTER

H.-General Provisions.
ARTICLE

V.

In bombardments by naval forces all the necessary measures must be taken by the
commander to spare as far as possible, buildings devoted to religion, to the arts, to
sciences, or to charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where
the sick or wounded are collected, on condition that they are not used at the same time
for military purposes.
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Ad1niral Aube on bombardment in 1882.-'I'he 1natter of
bombardment of undefended to,vns and places 'vas particularly emphasized in an article by Admiral Auhe in 1882.
This article appearing in the Revue des Deux Mondes attracted much attention. \Vhile the limitations upon bon1barcln1ent in warfare upon land had received consideration,
little attention had been given to the conduct of bombardment of coast tOl\rllS. It was part.ly the change in the construction of ships that had made maritime bombardment
of more in1portance. In the early part of this article
Admiral . .1-\.u be says:
L'objectif evident de toute marine militaire est la guerre maritime.
Le probleme fondamental qui s'impose a nos recherches avant tout
autre est done: Que sera une guerre maritime? Chose etrange! nul
aujourd'hui, meme parmi les plus distingues des hommes de mer, ne
peut repondre a cette question. J'ajoute: nul d'entre eux ne peut
It is the duty of the inhabitants to indicate such monuments, edifices, or places by
visible signs, which shall consist of large stiff rectangular panels dhided diagonally into
two coloured triangular portions, the upper portion black, the lower portion white.
ARTICLE

VI.

Unless the military exigencies will not permit, the commander of the attacking
naval force, before commencing the bombardment, must do his utmost to vtam the
authorities.
ARTICLE VII.
It is forbidden to give over to pillage a to'Wll or place, even when taken by assault.
CHAPTER

III.-Final Provisions.
ARTICLE

VIII.

The provisions of the present Convention do not apply except between Contracting
Powers, and then only if all the belligerents are .parties to the Convention.
ARTICLE

IX.

The present Convention shall be ratified as soon as possible.
Thera tifica tions shall be deposited at The Hague.
The first deposit of ratifications shall be recorded in a proces-verbal signed by the Representatives of the Powers which take part therein and by the Netherlands Minister of
Foreign Affairs.
The subsequent deposits of ratifications shall be made by means of a "\\Titten notification addressed to the Netherlands Government and accompanied by the instrument
of ratification.
A duly certified copy of the proces-verbal relative to the first deposit of ratifications
of the notifications mentioned in the preceding paragraph, as well as of the instruments of ratification, shall be at once sent by the ~etherlands Government, through
the diplomatic channel, to the Powers in'ited to the Second Peace Conference, as
well as to the other Pm,·ers which have adhered to the Convention. In the cases

ADl\liRAL AUBE'S I>OG'l'RINE.
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dire quel sera veritablement !'instrument de combat dans une telle
guerre.
Cette double assertion veut etre prouvee. X e semble-t-elle pas, en
effet, un pur paradoxe, alors que non seulemen t 1' Angle terre, pour
qui la mer est le supreme interet, mais toutes les nations du monde,
depensent chaque annee, et depuis plus de trente ans, des sommes
fabuleuses pour le maintien ou le developpement de leur marine
mili taire? L' Angle terre a ses Invincible, 1' I talie ses Duilio, la France
ses Devastation, et pas un de ces formidables engins de guerre, ou le
bronze, le fer, l'acier s'accumulent sous toutes les formes, ne serait le
type de.tinitif du vaisseau de combat de l'avenir! et leur reunion ne
consti tuerai t pas une de ces flottes puissan tes, sin on invincibles, sur
lesquelles une nation pourrait comme autrefois se reposer en toute
confiance et de ses interets commerciaux et de la securite de ses
frontieres maritimes! S'il en etait ainsi, si ce double but n'etait pas
atteint, si ces depenses etaient vaines et vains ces longs et perseverants
efforts, a quoi bon continuer dans une voie sans issue? ~Iais alors
quelles sont les causes de cette impuissance supposee des flottes de
guerre actuelles a assurer ces resultats superieurs et de leur inferiorite
en regard des flottes d'autrefois qui y suffisaient pleinement? (50,
Revue des Deux .L\Iondes, 1882, p. 315.)

The more particular reference to bombardment created
considerable discussion, and the 1naneuvers carried out
by various States on the supposition that bombardment
of undefended to,vns 'vould be permitted aroused further
interest 'vhich continued. Admiral Aube stated his
position as follo,vs:
Laguerre peut etre definie: l'appel supreme du droit contre la force
qui niece droit; d'ou l'objectif superieur de laguerre: faire le plus de
de mal possible a l'ennemi. Or, si un grand roi, philosophe et maitre
en l'art de la guerre, declare que la richesse est le nerf de la guerre,
contemplated in the preceding paragraph, the said Government shall inform them at
the same time of the date on which it received the notification.
ARTICLE

X.

Non-Signatory Powers may adhere to the present Convention.
The Power which desires to adhere shall notify its intention to the Netherlands Gov·
ernment, forwarding to it the act of adhesion, which shall be deposited in the archives
of the said Government.
This Government shall immediately transmit to all the other Powers a duly certified
copy of the notification, as well as of the act of adhesion, mentioning the date on which
it received the notification.
ARTICLE XI.
The present Convention shall take effect, in the case of the Powers which \vere a party
to the first deposit of ratifications, sixty days after the date of the proces-verbal of that
deposit, and, i:l the case of the Powers which ratify subsequently or which adhere, sixty
days after the notification of their ratification or of their adhesion has been received by
the ~ether lands Government.
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tout ce qui frappe l'ennemi dans sa richesse, a fortiori tout ce qui
l'atteint dans les sources memes de cette richesse, devient non-seulement legitime, mais s'impose comme obligatoire. Il faut done s'attendre a voir les flottes cuirassees, maltresses de la mer, tourner leur
puissance d'atta.que et de destruction, a defaut d'adversaires se derobant a leurs coups, contre toutes les villes du littoral, fortifiees ou non,
pacifiques ou guerrieres, les incendier, les ruiner et tout au moins les
ran~onner sans merci. Cela s'est fait autrefois; celanese faisait plus~
cela se fera encore: Strasbourg et Peronne en sont garants.
Par ce nouveau role et ces nouvelles missions que la logique impose
aux escadres cuirassees nous entrons dans un nouveau systeme de
guerre maritime: celui de l'attaque et de la defense des cotes. Quel
que soit le but de l'assaillant, il est evident qu'il se presentera en
force avec tous les moyens d'action que les circonstances lui permettront de reunir et qui seront calcules en vue du but special a atteindre.
Quant a la defense, elle semble devoir etre scindee en deux elements
distincts: defense fixe, defense mobile; l'une comprenant les torpilles dormantes, les barrages, les fortifications de tout genre, etablies
d'avance ou improvisees sur le rivage; l'autre, reposant sur l'action
isolee ou combinee des beliers, des batteries fiottantes, des canonnieres;
des thornycrofts porte-torpilles a grande vitesse, s'appuyant suivant
les lieux sur les vaisseaux cull-asses, sortant de !'inaction ou les condamnait en haute mer l'inferiorite du nombre. (Ibid., p. 331.)

Prof. Holland's opinion in 1888. -~~s the British naval
maneuvers of 1888 ,\~ere carried on 'vith the supposition
that the attacking squadron 1night fire upon any port in
GrAat Britain, this proposition created n1uch discussion.
Prof. Holland, of Oxford, took an active part in the disARTICLE

XII.

In the event of one of the contracting Powers wishing to denounce the present Con_
vention, the denunciation shall be notified in writi':lg to the~ etherlands Government,
which shall at once communicate a duly certified copy of the notification to all the
other Powers informing them of the date on which it was received.
The denunciation shall only han etTect in regard to the notifying Power, and one
year after the notification has reached the Netherlands Government.
ARTICLE

XIII.

A register kept by t:3e ~etherlands ~linister for Foreign Affairs shall give the date of
the deposit of ratifications made i'l virtue of Article IX, paragraphs 3 and 4, as well as
the date on which the notifications of adhesion (Article X, paragraph 2) or of denunciation (Article XII, paragraph 1) have been received.
Each Contracting Power is entitled to have access to this register and to be supplied
with duly certified extracts from it.
In faith whereof the Plenipotentiaries have appended their signatures to the present
Convention.
Done at The Hague, the 18th October, 1907, in a single copy, which shall remain deposited in the archives of the ~etherlands Go,·ernment, and duly certified copies of which
shall be sent, through the diplomatic channel, to the Powers which have been invited
to the Second Peace Conference.

HAGUE CONFERENCE, 1899.

cuss1on.
in 1888:
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One of his letters to the Times sho,vs his vie\v

SIR: In my first letter I called attention to certain operations of the
Spider and her consorts which seemed to be inspired by no principle
beyond that of doing unlimited mischief to the enemy's seaboard. In
a second letter I endeavored to distinguish between the mischief which
would and that which would not be regarded as permissible in civilized
warfare. The correspondence which has subsequently appeared in
your columns has made sufficiently clear the opposition between the
view which seems to find favor just now in naval circles and the principles of international law as I have attempted to define them. The
question between my critics and myself is, in effect, whether the
medieval or the modern view as to the treatment of private property
is to prevail. According to the former all such property is liable to be
seized or destroyed in default of a" Brandschatz," or ransom. According to the latter it is inviolable, subject only to certain well-defined
exceptions, among which reasonable requisitions of supplies would be
recognized, while demands of money contributions, as such, would
not be recognized. (Letters on \Var and Neutrality, p. 78.)

Authorities on internationalla\v \Vere in general accord
\vith Prof. Holland's vie\v.
The Hague Oon_ference of 1899.-At the First Hague
Conference the question of application of the same rules
to bombardment by naval forces \vhich had been proposed for bombardment by land forces \vas raised.
Article 25 of The Hague la\vs and customs of \Varon land,
adopted in 1899, provided: "The attack or bombardment
of to\vns, villages, habitations, or buildings \vhich are not
defended is forbidden." Count Nigra, of Italy, proposed
that this rule should extend to bombardment by naval
forces, and several delegates \Vere of the same opinion.
The subcommittee, considering the matter after discussion, decided to refer the question to the full conference,
as difference of opinion had arisen as to the competence
of the com1nittee to deal \vith the subject, \vhich \vas
thought by many to relate particularly to maritime \Varfare. (Conference Internationale de la Paix, 1899, pt. 3,
p. 103.)
The disposition of this question \Vas that in the final
act of the First Hague Conference the follo\ving \Vas
inserted:
6. The conference expresses the wish that the proposal to settle the
question of the bombardment of ports, towns, and villages by a naval
force may be referred to a subsequent conference for consideration.
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The 1natter accordingly received son1e attention bet,,~een the years 1899 and 1907.
General discussion at The Hague, 1.907. -The discussion
in 1907 on the general subject of bombard1nent by naval
forces 1nade it clear that there "yas reason for distinguishing bo1nbardn1ent on land fron1 bo1nbardtnent by naval
forces. The regulation for bo1nbardn1ent by land forces
had been discussed at Brussels in 1874 in dra"~ing up the
rules for 'Yar upon land, and it 'Yas evident that the rules
could not be directly applicable to 'varfare upon land and
on sea, as had been sho,vn at the conference at The Hague
in 1899 and in earlier discussions at the meetings of the
Institute of International La,Y. Bo1nbardn1ent by n1aritin1e forces 'vould partake both of the nature of land
"~arfare and of naval 'varfare. 1\..n inland place n1ight
be indirectly defended by fortifications on a coast at a
considerable distance. The Netherlands delegate maintained that such defense of the coast should be distinguished fron1 defense of the place itself, because this \\Tould
be only an indirect defense of the place and the place
itself "Tould not be regarded as defended. This 'vas follo\\~ecl by the discussion upon the question as to w·hether
sub1narine n1ines could be regarded as a direct defense.
"Gpon this subject there 'vas decided difference of opinion:
Propositions at Second Hague Conference, 1907.-Propositions in regard to boinbardinent by naval forces in
ti1ne of 'va,r 'vere n1ade at The Hague conference of 1907
by the delegations of the United States, Spain, Italy,
Netherlands, and Russia. These propositions 'vere reduced to a single projet, and submitted to the first subcon1n1ittee of the third committee in the follow·ing form:
ARTICLE l. Dans le bombardement par les forces navales toutes les
mesures necessaires doivent etre prises par le commandant pour eparner, autant que possible, les monuments historiques, les edifices consacres aux cultes, aux arts, aux sciences eta la bienfaisance, les hopitaux
et les lieux de rassemblement de malades ou de blesses a condition
qu'ils ne soient pas employes en meme temps a un but militaire.
Le devoir des habitants est de designer ces monuments, ces edifices
ou lieux de rassemblement par des signes visibles speciaux.
ART. 2. Le commandant de forces navales assaillantes, avant d'entreprendre le bombardement, devra faire tout ce qui depend de lui pour
a vertir les au tori tes.

'VHAT CONSTITUTES DEFENSE.
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ART. 3. II est interdit de livrer au pillage meme une ville ou localite
prises d'assaut.
ART. 4. II estinterditde bombarder des ports, villes, villages, habitations, ou batiments qui ne sont pas defendus.
ART. 5. Lorsque les necessites des operations militaires exigent la
destruction d'ouvrages militaires, d'etablissements militaires ou
navales, de depots d'armes ou de materiels de guerre, d'ateliers
utilises pour les besoins de la fiotte ou de l'armee ennemie, ou de vaisseaux de guerre se trouvant dans le port, le commandant de la force
navale pourra proceder lui-meme a la dite destruction par bombardement, si les autorites locales ont, apres sommation formelle et apres
!'expiration d'un delai raisonnable, refuse de satisfaire aces exigences.
Dans ce cas, les ports, vllles et villages, habitations ou batiments
sont passibles des dommages involontaires resultant du bombardement.
ART. 6. Le bombardement des ports, villes, villages, haf>itations
ou batiments est admissible, apres qu'avis en aura ete donne quand la
fourniture de vivres, ou d'approvisionnements necessaires pour les
besoins du moment de la force navale presente, apres sommation
formelle faite aux autorites locales, est refusee.
ART. 7. Le bombardement des ports, villes, villages, habitations
ou batiments non defendus, pour le non payement d'une contribution
en argent, est prohibe." (Deuxieme Conference Internationale de
la Paix, Tome III, p. 657.)

France proposed to substitute for article 5 of the
above proj et the follo\ving:
N e sont pas compris dans cette interdiction les ouvrages militaires,
etablissements militaires ou navales, depots d'armes ou de materiel
de guerre, ateliers et installations propres a etre utilises pour les besoins
de la fiotte ou de l'armee ennemie. et les navires de guerre se trouvant
dans le port que le commandant d'une force navale pourra, apres sommation avec delai raisonnable, detruire par le canon si tout autre moyen
est impossible et lorsque les autorites locales n'auront pas procede a
cette destruction dans le delai fixe.
Si des necessites militaires imperieuses exigeant une action immediate ne permettaient pas d'accorder de delai, il reste entendu que
!'interdiction de bombarder la ville non defendue subsiste comme dans
le cas precedent et que le commandant prendra toutes les dispositions
voulues pour qu'll en resulte pour cette ville le moins d'inconvenients
possibles. (Ibid., p. 658.)

What constit1.Ltes defense?-One of the early questions
raised at The Hague in 1907 \Vas as to \vhat constitutes
defense. Gen. den Beer Poortugael, of the N" etherlands
delegation, in discussing the question and referring to
the projet before the subcommittee, said, in giving his
opinion:
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Qu'entend-on par ville non-defendue?
Dans les guerres terrestres il n'y a pas de doutes, c'est clair comme
le jour. U ne force armee est en marc he vers une ville. Cette ville
peut etre fortifiee ou ouverte. l\feme si elle est ordinairement ouverte,
les entrees pourront etre defendues par des ouvrages temporaires devant
les entrees, par des epaulements, des barricades, des tambours. Il va
sans dire que l'assaillant a parfaitement le droit de briser cette defense
a l'aide de son artillerie de la maniere qu'il trouvera la plus efficace,
pour s'emparer de la ville. Toutefois, il concentrera cette artillerie
contre les moyens de defense, contre les epaulements, contre l'artillerie
et les soldats defenseurs, et se gardera bien d'envoyer ses grenades ou
obus en pure perte dans la ville elle-meme, car ces projectiles ne pourraient avoir pour resultats que d'incendier quelques maisons. En
agissant de la sorte il prouvera qu'il est a la fois homme de cceur et
qu'il sait son metier, qualites qui, la dans plupart des cas, se trouvent
reunies.
:Mais dans ce qui nous occupe a present, il existe le danger qu'on
pourrait en juger differemment.
La marine ne marche pas vers une ville. Elle n'aura pour but de
s'en emparer, que dans le cas ou elle agit conjointement avec des forces
de terre. Je n'ai naturellement pas en vue des ports fortifies mais des
villes ou villages non-fortifies et non-defend us.
Prenons, par e:x:emple, pour mieux exprimer rna pensee, notre cote,
que baigne la l\Ier d u X orcl. Le long de cette cote se trou vent a pro ximite de la mer, par-ci, par-la, une ville et des villages, La Haye, ou
Scheveningue, Katwyck, ~oordwyck, etc.
Supposez le cas-dont le bon Dieu nous garde-qu'au lieu de tant
d'amis dont les representants sont reunis ici, nous ayons un jour un
ennemi, qui tente d'entreprendre, seconde de sa £lotte, un debarquement. Naturellement nous l'acceuillerons avec tousles honneurs dus
a sa gentillesse; nous ferons tout pour l'en empecher. On enverra des
d etachemen ts d 'artillerie, d 'in fan terie et de cavalerie dans les dunes
de Scheveningue, de Katwyck, etc., et nous defendrons notre cote,
pour que l'ennemi ne prenne pas pied.
Schevenlngue c'est pour ainsi dire La Haye. Est-ce que de la
defense de la cote de Scheveningue on pourra conclure que LaHaye
est defendue pour bombarder cette ville toute ouverte?
Non, assurement non. L'ennemi a certainement tout les droita
d'employer son artillerie contre notre artillerie et les autres defenses de
la cote, autant qu'ille jugera utile, mais il n'a pas le droit de bombarder
la ville sous pretexte que ce serait une ville defendue.
Selon nwi, ce serait la une cruaute et une violation des principes du
droit, parce que ce serait une cruaute inutile; car il va soi que meme
si la moitie de ces vllles paisibles et fleuries que vous admirez avec le
Chateau des Comtes dans lequel nous avons la Conference de la Paix,
etait entamee par les flammes et si le Palais de la Paix, dont dans
quelques jours nous verrons poser la premiere pierre s'ecroulait sous
les bombes, nos soldats dans les dunes n'en ressentiraient rien, et meme
leur ardeur de combattre de tels bar bares destructeurs en serait stimulee.

BRITISH OPINION BECAUSE OF ~fiNES.
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J'ai pris pour exemple la ville que nous avons tous sous les yeux,
mais naturellement le cas est le meme pour toutes les villes ouvertes
situees pres d'une cote.
Je constate done qu'il faut bien dlstinguer la defense de la cote de
celle d'une ville, situee pres de cette cote et que, par ville defendue il ne
doit etre entendu qu'une ville qui est elle-meme defendue directement.
(Deuxieme Conference Internationale de la Paix, Tome III, p. 545.)

British opinion on bombardment because of mines.Article 4 of the original proj et 'vas transposed and became
article 1 of the proposed convention on bombardment,
and a second paragraph 'vas added so that article 1 was
drafted in the follo,ving 'vords:
The bombardment by naval forces of undefended ports, towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings is forbidden.
A place can not be bombarded scl (~ly because automatic contact
submarine mines are anchored off the harbor.

The second paragraph of this article 'vas the subject
of difference of opinion. The British delegate, Capt.
(Admiral) Ottley, speaking in the name of the British
delegation, gave a full statement of the objections to the
prOVISIOn, saying:
Je voudrais dire quelques mots pour expliquer la reserve faite au
nom de la Delegation britannique, en ce qui concerne l'alinea 2 de
I' article 1, qui est ainsi con~u:
"Une localite ne peut pas etre bombardee pour le seul fait que devant
elle se trouvent mouillees des mines sous-marines automatiques de
contact.''
A premiere vue cette proposition pourrait paraitre tout a fait acceptable par le fait que ces mines ne sont, en effet, qu'une defense passive,
et qu'elles ne peuvent frapper un enneml que s'il s'approche de cette
localite.
Bombarder une ville parce qu'elle s'est ainsi assuree de son inviolabilite semble done, ace point de vue, etre un outrage injustifiable.
Mais, d'autre part, on pourrait egalement soutenir que des canons ne
constituent qu'une defense passive, puisque c'est seulement en s'en
approchant qu'un valsseau peut etre atteint.
Or, le tir des canons peut rarement detruire un vaisseau au large,
tandis que !'explosion d'une seule mine le coulera certainement.
Aussi, ne nous parait-il pas logique de rendre inviolable une ville
defendue au moyen de mines tandis qu'en meme temps on refuse le
meme privilege a une ville defendue par des canons.
C'est !'interet de tousles pays neutres de rendre lamer libre de ces
engins meurtriers, puisque, etant completement aveugles, ils sont
egalement dangereux pour amis, ennemis, neutres et non-combattants.
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ll est, a ce point de vue, de la plus haute iinportance que l'emploi
illimite et sans but de ces mines soit restreint le plus possible.
Dans le cas qui nous occupe, la pose des 1nines sera certainement
sans but, puisque-par hypothese-la ville etant autrement non
defendue, ne sera pas exposee au bombardement.
On pent franchement se demander pour quelle raison on n1ouillera
des mines clevant un tel port?
Tout d'aborcl il ne se trouve expose a aucun danger et la pose de
mines n'est en consequence pas autre chose qu'une defense douteuse
con tre un danger nonexistan t.
11 se1nble que la proposition envisage la situation speciale de certaines villes maritimes qui, quoique non defendues par des canons,
sont pourvues de chantiers de construction on d'autres etablissements
militaires qu'un ennemi pourrait vouloir avec raison detruire.
11 est naturel que l'iclee soit venue de vouloir ainsi defendre des
ports de Ce genre, en Ineme temps qu'on les mettrait a ·l'abri d'un
bon1bardement.
l\Iais je crains que les interets des neutres aussi bien que ceux des
belligerants ne soient serieusement leses si l'on adoptait une telle
regle; aussi je p~ie la commission de bien vouloir accepter notre amendement, c'est-a-dire de" supprimer le deuxieme alinea de !'article 1."
Cet amendement nous mettrait d'accord avec !'article 25 du Reglement concernant les lois et coutumes de la guerre sur terre. De ·
plus, il appliquerait ce principe fondamental qu'un belligerant, en
accordant une im1nunite a une localite enne1nie non defendue, a le
droit de faire usage de cette localite non defenclue et de s'attendre
a ce qu'en s'approchant d'une ville soi-disant non defendue, il ne soit
pas expose a etre detruit par ceux-la meme qui pretendent etre inviolables sous le pretexte alors bizarre que leur ville n'est pas defendue.
(Deuxien1e Conference de la Paix, Tome III, p. 343.)

·vote on article 1, paragraph 2. -After the expression of
opi:~ ion ly the British delegate and some discussion, the
first paragraph of article 1, having been generally approved, the seco:~ d paragraph "ras put to a vote and 22
voted for the pnragntph, 5 voted against, and 10 did not
vote. ..:\.n1or g the stn,tes that flid not vote for the paragraph 'vere Great Britain, Japan, Gern1any, United
States, Fr:11~ ce, and :' ussirJ.
Ratification of convention.-The convention relative to
bombardment by naYal forces in time of 'var has been
generally ratified, though son1e of the states as Ger1nany
ar·d Gre:tt Britain, haYe mtde reserYation as to arti~le 1,
paragraph 2. The U r~ i terl States proclaimed this convention February 28, 1910.
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Opinion of Dupuis.-Dupuis, 'vriting in 1911, gives an
interpretation of paragraph 2, of article 1, saying:
La question ne laisse pas assurement d'etre delicate. Autoriser le
bombardement des loc~lites defendues par des mines sons-marines
automatiques de contact, ce serait, semble-t-il, risquer de faire une
breche formidable au principe de !'interdiction, si les belligerants
venaient a faire un large usage de ces moyens de defense. Et comme
il est impossible de voir si une ville est ou non protegee par des mines
sous-marines, les navires de guerre pourraient etre portes a interpreter
le doute comme autorisant le bombardement.
Mais, d'autre part, il est difficile de refuser le caractere de defense a
!'immersion de mines; cette immersion n'a, en effet, d'autre but que
d'empecher l'ennemi d'entrer au port, et c'est la precisement le but
de toute defense. Les mines, dira-t-on, ne constituent qu'une defense
passive, puisqu'elles ne peuvent frapper un ennemi que s'il s'approche;
mais, selon la tres juste observation du Capitaine Ottley, il en est de
meme des canons dont le tir n'est a craindre qu'autant que l'on s'en
approche; d'autre part, il y a correlation logique-pour ne pas dire
necessaire-entre le droit, pour une localite, de n'etre pas attaquee et
le droit, pour l'ennemi, de penetrer dans cette localite. D'ailleurs,
lier l'immunite de bombardement a !'absence de mines serait un sur
moyen de rarefier l'emploi d'engins peu recommandables, sinon meme
de le supprimer, devant les ports qui ne pourraient avoir d'autre
defense. La faculte de bombarder les localites defendues par des
mines n'augmenterait sans doute pas le nombre des bombardements;
elle ne ferait vraisemblablement que diminuer le nombre des mines
et ce serait un heureux resultat. (Le droit de la guerre maritime, p.
95, no. 43.)

Institute of International Law, 1913 .-The su1~ j ec t of
bombardment 'vas considered at the Oxford meeting of
the Irstitute of International J_ja'v in 1913. The discussion of 1 ombardment on a~count· of mines cefore the
port came up in connection 'vith the proposed article 28,
and as several an1e:1dn1ents "~ere suggested, the resun1e
of the discussion shov{S the tre~d of opi r ion:

:M. le Rapporteur donne lecture de !'article 28, qui est ainsi con9u:
"Bombardement.-Il est interdit de bombarder des ports, villes,
villages, habitations ou batiments qui ne sont pas defendus.
"Une localite ne peut pas etre bombardee a raison du seul fait que,
devant son port, se trouvent mouillees des mines sous-marines automatiques de contact."
M. Fusinato estime que !'expression "qui ne sont pas defendus" est
equivoque. Faut-il entendre par la les villes ouvertes ou bien les
villes, meme fortifiees, qui ne se defendent pas? L'article 29, qui
permet la destruction d'ouvrages fortifies dans le cas vise par !'article
28, parait indiquer que la deuxieme interpretation est plus conforme
aux sentiments de la commission.

80

BO:\IBARD:\IENT BY NAYAL FORCES.

Il serait bon, en tous cas, pour ecarter toute confusion, de remplacer,
dans cet article et dans les dernieres lignes de l'article 29, les mots
"qui ne sont pas defendus" par les mots "qui ne se defendent pas."
J\L Hagerup fait observer que l'amendement de l\f. Fusinato souleve
une grave question. Un commandant d'escadre ne peut-il commencer
le bombardeinent d'une ville rnunie de fortifications en plein etat de
defense, avant que ces fortifications aient servi a un acte de defense?
L'an1ende1nent semble entrainer comme consequence qu'un bombardement ne peut jamais commencer sans une sommation prealable,
ce qui va tres loin. Toutefois, en principe il trouve louable la tendance
de restreindre les conditions de bombardement.
:.\f. Strisower declare accepter l'amendement de l\f. Fusinato; car,
si la regie s'applique rarement a des villes fortifiees ne se defendant
pas, elle trouvera au contraire souvent son application dans !'hypothese de villes non fortifiees qui se defendraient. Ces dernieres pourrout etre boinbardees.
:JI. Fusinato fait remarquer que le premier cas indique par ~f. Strisower s'est present·e lors de la recente guerre italo-turque; on s'est
demande si, pour amener l'ennemi a la paix, on pouvait bombarder
des villes fortifiees alors meme qu'elles ne se dCfendaient pas. La
solution negative parait devoir etre admise.
L'a1nendement de 1\f. Fusinato sur le premier alinea est rnis aux
voix et adopte.
~L le President donne lecture d'un amendement de ~fM:. Harburger,
Oppenheim, de Bar, Krauel et Lawrence tendant a la suppression du
deuxieme a linea.
Lord Reay expose qu'une localite protegee par des mines sonsmarines est evidemment defendue et peut, par consequent, etre bombardee.
~L le l\farquis Corsi appuie !'observation de Lord Reay. Tous les
Etats s'empresseraient de placer des mines devant les ports difficiles
a defendre, s'ils pouvaient par la echapper au bombardement.
l\L le Rapporteur repond a Lord Reay que s'il fallait considerer
comme defendue~, et des lors comme susceptibles de bombardement,
les localites ou des mines seraient mouillees, toutes les localites pourraient en fait etre bombardees, car un belligerant ne sera jamais certain
que des mines n'auront pas ete placees et dans lf~ doute il croira toujours a leur immersion.
~L Ed. Rolin JaequemynE~, d'accord avec l\1. Clunet, exprime l'avis
que le seui fait d'avoir place des mines ne saurait suffire a justifier
un bombardement.
Si, par contre, des mines restent mouillees devant le port sous le
controle des autorites, elles constituent nne defense qui rend le bombardement licite.
l\f. Ed. Rolin Jaequemyns propose done de substituer aux mots "se
trouvent mouillees" les mots "ont ete mouillees."
1\f. Fiore propose, pour plus de clarte, d'ajouter au deuxieme alinea
de !'article 28 la phrase: "une localite devant laquelle se trouvent
mouillees des mines de contact peut etre bombardee."
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.M. Hagerup se declare partisan du maintien du texte de la commission. Les Anglais verraient, sans doute, sans deplaisir !'abandon de
!'usage des mines, mais il est essentiel pour les pays disposant de cotes
etendues et d'une faible marine de pouvoir employer ce moyen de
defense. L'amendement de ~111. Edouard Rolin et Clunet semble
du reste etre en contradiction avec la decision prise au sujet de I' amendement de !\I. Fusinato, interdisant la destruction des villes pour la
seule raison qu' elles seraient fortifiees.
~1. Axel de Vedel se rallie a !'opinion de 11. Hagerup.
Lord Reay declare qu' ~1 n' est pas plus partisan dn bombardement
que ~1. Hagerup n'est partisan de !'abandon de !'usage des mines.
Toutefois, illui parait evident qu'un port protege par des mines est en
etat de se defendre. Des lors, il n'y a pas de raison pour interdire le
bombardement.
~I. Strisower observe que le bombardement doit avoir pour but de
vaincre Ia resistance de Ia ville. Or, de fajt il ne peut pas servircomme
moyen d' ecarter des mines et il ne saurait etre employe comme une
peine pour a voir pose des mines. C' est pourquoi il se declare pour le
maintien de l'alinea et de !'article.
11. de Bar fait remarquer que !'interdiction de bon1barder une ville
defendue par des mines aurait pour effet de conferer a celle-ci une
veritable immunite.
L'amendement de l\L Ed. Rolin Jaequemyns est mis aux voix et
rejete par 27 voix contre 6 voix.
~L Fauch~lle, rapporteur, propose, 2n son nom personnel, de modifier
le second alinea de la maniere suivante: "Une localite peut etre bombardee s'il est etabli que, devant son port, se trouvent mouillees des
mines sous-marines automatiques de contact."
!\I. Niemeyer propose de snbsti tuer le mot "cote " au mot "port,"
afin d'eYiter qu'on puisse conclure du projet actuel que le bombardement d'une cote protegee par des mines est licite.
La proposition de 11. Niemeyer est mise aux voix et adoptee par
20 voix contre 12 voix.
L'ensernble de !'article 28 est vote par 24 contre 16 voix. (Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit International, }~XVI, pp. 533-537 .)

A committee was appointed to draft the rules in such
form as 'vould make the arrangement and phraseology
consistent, and article 28 'vas numbered 25, and in the
final draft reads;
Article 25 (28). Bombardement.-Il est interclit de bombarder des
ports, villes, villages, 'habitations ou hfi,timents qui ne se defendent pas.
Une localite ne peut pas etre bombardee a raison du seul fait que,
devant ses cotes, se trouvent mouillees des mines sons-marines autom?.tiques de contact. (Ibid., p. 615.)

The Institute of International La'v at Oxford modified
the phraseology in regard to bombardment in article 25
71396-15-6*
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of the manual adopted so as to read, "Il est interdit de
bo1nbarder des ports, villes, villages, habitations, ou
batiments qui ne se defendent pas." The last clause
had been in earlier drafts as in article 1 of the Hague
convention of bombardment" qui ne sont pas defendus."
The change here and else,vhere fro1n places '' 'vhich are
not defended" to places "'vhich do not defend themselves" materially modifies. the application of the rules
and n1akes the ground of bombard1nent an act of defense
which 1nay be uncertain instead of a condition of defense 'vhich 1nay be discoverable by observation. Indeed, there has not been as yet any satisfactory determination of 'vhat kind of an act may constitute defense.
It is doubtful 'vhether the change introduced by the
Institute in the first paragraph from "qui ne sont pas
defend us" to "qui ne se defendent pas," 'vill be approved by a!). international conference. The prohibition
against the bo1nbardment of an undefended place is
based upon the genrally accepted principle of exemption
of noncombatants. The changed phraseology prohibits
bon1bardment of places 'vhich do not defend themselves,
or 'vhich do not exercise a po,ver of defense 'vhich they
may possess. In actual practice, such a regulation
may put the approaching fleet at a great disadvantage
in some instances, placing it perhaps at the 1nercy of the
commander of the place 'vhich it approaches. A fleet
may approach a defended place. The place may have
guns of a less range than the fleet or may have mines at
a cer.tain distance. The commander of the fleet knows
the place is defended. l-Ie could compel the surrender
of the place by his longer range guns. By implication
bombardment is forbidden because no defense is offered.
When the flee,t comes 'vithin range of the shore guns,
however, there is no obligation upon the commander on
shore to refrain from attack which may sink or disable
the fleet 'vhich, but for this regulation, 'vould control
the coast. If the regulation should be drawn in such
fashion as to prohibit bombardment of places 'vhich,
'vhether or not defended, agree to offer no defense, or to
refrain from hostile action against the fleet, the fleet and
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the shore forces are placed upon a footing more nearly
equal.
Resume.-The attitude to,vard bombardment as sho,vn
in the article by Admiral Aube 'vas succeeded by an attitude much more in accord 'vith the modern tendency
toward mitigation of the evils of war as regards noncombatants. The Hague Conference of 1899 did not reach a
conclusion on the matter of bombardment, and the Conference of 1907 adopted the paragraph prohibiting "bombardment solely because automatic contact submarine
mines were anchored off the harbor" by a vote of 22 out
of 37. Among those not voting for this paragraph 'vere
the more important maritime States. Some of these
States, as Germany, Great Britain, and Japan, have made
reservations on this paragraph. Some of the leading authorities on international law regard the paragraph as
illogical and as tending to aggravate the evil it aimed to
remedy. The Institute of International La'v adopted
a somewhat modified form by changing the word "harbor" to "coasts." The vote 'vas 24 against 16. There.
was naturally a reluctance to change a paragraph which
had received much consideration at The Hague in 1907.
It may be observed that the statement tha~ a place
can not be bombarded solely because mines are anchored
off the coast is not any considerable restriction upon
bombardment, as there would seem to be little or no
reason for such bombardment. Other reasons 'vould
usually be present before bombardment would be considered expedient. Reasons could ordinarily be found
by a commander who 'vishes to bombard a place which
is defended by mines. Every ,enemy port might properly be regarded 'vith suspicion.
It is said in the convention concerning bombardment
by naval forces in time of war that it was dra,vn 'vith a
"desire to serve the interests of humanity and to diminish the severity and disasters of war."
Few instruments of 'var are more to be feared than
submarine mines. They constitute a hidden danger
tending to increase rather than diminish the horrors of
war. It is even doubtful whether this paragraph 2 of

84

BO)IBARDl\IENT BY NAVAL FORCES.

article 1 docs not tend to increase the possibility of bombardment because sanctioning to a degree the use of
n1ines before places 'vhich 'vould otherwise be clearly undefended and therefore not liable to attack. A place not
liable to attack solely because of the n1ines before the
harbor 1nay be bo1nbardcd 'vhcn an additional 1nilitary
reason is pre.3ent. 'fhis 1nilitary reason n1ight not be
sufficient to justify the bombardment if n1ines "~ere not
before the place. Paragraph 2 of article 1, stating that
~'a place can not be bo1nbardcd solely because auton1atic
contact submarine 1nines are anchored off the harbor,"
n1ay lead to the placing of 1nines along an othenvise undefended coast. The opposing belligerent "'"ould find
some means to 1neet a situation 'vhich might place his
force.s at a disadvantage.
The paragraph of article 1 providing that" a place can
not be boinbarded solely because automatic contact submarine 1nines are· anchored off the harbor" has not been
accepted by son1e of the larger naval po"'"ers 'vho have
:ratified the remaining articles of the convention.
The reasons seem sufficient to 'varrant a revision of
paragraph 2 of article 1 and possibly its entire rejection.
Bombardment of materiel of war.-V\Thile the first article of the convention relative to bombardment by naval
forces prohibits the bon1bardn1ent of strictly undefended
to,vns, the second article sho,vs that the materiel of 'var
of the neighborhood is not therefore excn1pt. The first
paragraph of article 2 is as follo"Ts:
ARTICLE 2. :Military works, military or naval establishments, depots
of arms or war material, workshops or plant which could be utilized
lor the needs of the hostile fleet or army, and ships of war in the harbor, are not, however, included in this prohibition. The commander
of a naval force may destroy them with artillery, after a summons followed by a reasonable delay, if all other means are impossible, and when
the local authorities have not themselves destroyed them within the
time fixed.

As is sho,vn in the report to the conference, article 2
is closely rcla ted to article 1, and enumerates certain exceptions to the general prohibition of article 1. The
proposition before the subcommi.ssion having the subject of bombardment in charge, to include the 'vords
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"provisions qui peuvent etre utilises," did not rece1ve
sufficient support and was 'vithdrawn.
Report at I-Iague Conference.-The report of the subcommittee on bombardment explains the meaning of
this article. This report says:
L'article 2 est si etroitement lie ala disposition de !'article 1, comme
il appert d'ailleurs du mot "toutefois" qui l'y rattache, qu'on a onge
a reunir les deux articles en un seul. A pres mure reflexion, le comite
d'examen s'en est abstenu, pour bien faire ressortir, degage de toute
consideration secondaire, le principe etabli par le premier article.
L'article 2 envisage la premiere exception a ce principe; elle semble
s'in1poser vu les besoins speciaux de laguerre navale; en effet, tandis
que dans laguerre terrestre le belligerant aura la faculte de s'emparer
d'une place non defendue et d'y proceder, sans avoir recours a un
bombardement, a toute destruction qui servirait a ses operations militaires, le commandant des forces navales sera quelquefois tenu de
detruire, sous certaines conditions, par le canon, si tout autre moyen
lui echappe, les constructions ennemies servant a des buts militaires,
lorsqu'il ne dispose pas d'un corps de debarquement suffisant ou qu'il
est oblige de se retirer rapidement; de meme, il se trouvera peut-etre
dans la necessite de detruire par le canon, dans des conditions analogues, les vaisseaux de guerre ennemis se trouvant dans un port,
meme dans les cas ou ces vaisseaux de guerre ne serviraient pas a
defendre la ville et que partant il s'agitait d'une ville non defendue.
Sur le principe de cette premiere excpetion tout le monde etait
d'accord. On a egalement fini par reconnaitre unanimement qu'il y
aurait lieu d'ajouter aux constructions, qui, le cas echeant, pourraien
etre detruites par un bombardement, les "installations" propres a
etre utilisees pour les besoins de la flotte ou de l'armee ennemie (par
exemple, des lignes ferrees ou des docks flottants); une proposition plus
large, tendant a y faire ajouter encore "les provisions" (par exemple,
des depots de charbon) fut retiree par s8n auteur, !'expression "materiel de guerre," qui est contenue dans cet article, lui donnant une
satisfaction suffisante et parce que !'objection fut formulee de plusieurs cotes que pareil amendement aurait une portee trop generale et
pourrait compromettre la teneur meme de !'interdiction.
Mais la sous-commission n'a pu se mettre d'accord et des tentatives
faites en ce sens dans le comite d'examen ont egalement ete infructueuses sur les conditions qui permettraient au commandant des forces
navales, se trouvant devant une place non defendue, de proceder luimeme a une destruction par le canon des etablissements nlilitaires,
etc., a defaut, bien entendu, d'autres moyens moins dangereux, dont
il pourait se servir. (Deuxieme Conference Internationale de la Paix,
Tome III, p. 344.)

This explanation implies that there is a right to destroy
the lines of raihvay under certain circumstances. The
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la"'"s regulating the conduct of \vnr on land permit the
seizure of the 1nean.s of transport. On the sea, private
enen1y ships 1nay be captured, and by the la\vs in regard
to the days of grace giving exe1nption to certain ships,
the exen1ption .is not extended to vessels intended to be
converted into vessels of \Var. It is evident that very fe\V
vessels 1nay not serve a hostile purpose, such as for transportation of coal, supplies, or t1 oops. Tl].e n1eans of transportation are often the most effective n1eans of attack
or of defense, enabling a belligerent to center his forces
at a point of advantage at a given tin1e.
The bo1nbard1nent of a ship of \Var is specifically pernlitted under the restrictions provided in article 2. A
private ship \vhich had been converted to a ship of \var
\vould be si1nilarly liable. The \Vord "installations/'
w·hich is used in the convention, is considered to include
floating clocks. ..A. partly completed· ship of \Var or collier
deaignecl for the fleet \vould be included in the '' 1nn teriel
de guerre." A con1pleted private ship 1nay be more
easily rendered serviceable by conversion than a partly
con1pleted public ship, therefore should be regarded and
treated as "n1ateriel de guerre."
Private ships of the enen1y 1nay, under certain circumstances, be destroyed. One of the necessary prerequisites is that the persons on the private vessel be placed
in safety. It \vould be particularly easy for those on
board a private vessel in a harbor to \vithdra\v to a place
of safety, thus meeting the requiren1ent in that respect,
and the vessel1nay be destroyed by bo1nbardment if there '
be controlling reason.
Article V of the Hague convention relative to the status
of enen1y merchant ships at the outbreak of hostilities
provides as to exemption that "the present convention
does not affect merchant ships "'"hose construction indicates that they are intended to be converted into ships
of war."
""Vessels already converted into ships of \Var \Vould not
be entitled to any exemption.
It has been admitted that "no objection can be taken
to the bombardment of shipbuilding yards in \vhich ves-
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sels of ''?ar or cruisers can be built." (Ilall, Int. La,v,
5th ed., p. 536, note 3.)
The belligerent passing along a coast "?oulcl see1n therefore to have the right to take such action as should prevent undue risk to the success of his operations. An
undefended place should also be exempt from 'var risks
as far as the exigencies of 'var per1nit, The con1mander
of a naval force may destroy "?ar material 'vith artillery
"after a summons follo"?ed by a reasonable delay, if all
other 1neans are impossible, and 'vhen the local au thorities have not themselves destroyed them 'vithin the time
fixed." (IX Convention, art. 2.)
\T essels, even though private property, are not granted
the same exemptions as son1e other classes of private
property. 11any vessels are now· built 'vith the vie'v to
possible conversion to 'var uses. This conversion may
be made ,vithin a very brief period, "?hen the vessel 'vill
be con1pletely ready for use for w·ar purposes. The transfer of control 1nay be all that is necessary for vessels
'vhich are to be used for transport and similar service.
As bridges in land '''"arfare n1ay be absolutely necessary,
so vessels may be absolutely necessary in naval "'"arfare.
The treatment of both 1nust "?ithin the la'v be deter1nined
by n1ilitary necessity. ~nen1y private vessels at sea may
be captured, and under certain conditions may be destroyed.
The regulations in regard to the treatment of enemy
vessels 'vhich may easily be converted into ships of 'var
are not yet satisfactory. A belligerent should not be
liable to undue risk because of liberality in the treatn1ent
of the merchant vessels of the enen1y.
So1ne arrangement n1ay possibly be 1nacle by 'vhich
the conversion of merchant vessels jnto ships of "?ar may
be prohibited, or the innocence of n1erchant vessels may
be satisfactorily guaranteed. Such arrangement must,
ho,vever, be satisfactory to the belligerent 'vho threatens
bombard1nent, and he bo1nbards at his o'vn risk.
Doctrines of military necessity .-There seem to be t'vo
doctrines of military necessity: (1) There are still some
who maintain that 1nilitary necessity n1ay overrule all
]a,v. (2) There are others ,vho 1naintain that military
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necessity nHty justify certain extren1e action w·ithin the
ltnv.

The first doctrine has gradually received less nnd less
support., nnd action in nceord "·ith it ""ould probably· be
just ground for retaliation "·hich n1igh t be beyond the
ln"·s of "·ar. 'l,he I Ingue ln."·s and custon1s of "·n.r on
land pronoun~e in artie le 22 that "thr right of bellig-erents
to the choice of 1nenns of injuring the ene1ny is not unliinited." Even if a belligerent should be hard pressed
and in in1n1inent danger of capture, this necessity "·ould
not justify the use of poisoned ,,·eapons against his opponent, or the in1proper use of the flag of truce. This first
doctrine of 1nilitary necessity is one "·hieh dates fro1n
a period before there existed ln"·s of ,,·ar, and bnrbarous
or inhun1an action sought sanction in ,,·hat ""as called
necessity·. Grotius, \Vriting in 1625, show·s that neressity
\Vas to be strictly interpreted. but · so1ne, "Titing n1ueh
later. have reverted to the early idea that any ac.t could
be justified in nn extre1ne case. Even Von :Jioltke, in
1881, expressed his disngreen1en t ,,·ith the Declaration of
St. Petersburg \Vhich expressed the doctrine that ''the
\Veakening of the 1nilitary forces of the enen1y" "·as the
legiti1nate object of \Var. \ . .on :Jioltke n1aintained that a
"speedy cone lusion" \\'"as the Ina in o bj ec t of \\"ar, and
that all 1nethods, save those absolutely objectionable,
could be used. This position of "Von :Jfoltke is not as
extren1e as those w·ho find no li1nit w·hich 1nilitary necessity 1nay not justify.
The second doctrine, that 1nilitnry necessity nuty justify
certain extre1ne action w"ithi.n the la\\" 1 is the one generally
accepted by civilized states. 'fhis is the point of vie\v
accepted by the United States in one of the earliest of the
codes of \Var, the ,,. . ar Depart1nent General Order 100,
of . 1\.pril
.
24, 1863, generally kno\\"11 as Lieber's Code.
Articles 14, 15, 16, and 19 sho,,· the attitude of the United
States in 1863, and this attitude purports to reflect that
of civilized nations:
14. :Military necessity, as understood by modern civilized nations,
consists in the nece8sity of those measures which are indispensable for
seCliring the ends of the war and which are ]awful according to the
modern law and usages of war.
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15. :\filitary necessity admits of all direct destruction of life or limb
of armed enemies, and of other persons whose destruction is incidentally unavoidable in the armed contests of the \Var ; it allo"~s of the capturing of every armed enemy, and every enemy of importance to the
hostile Goven1ment or of peculiar danger to the captor; it allows of all
destruction of property and obstruction of the ways and channels of
traffic, travel, or communication, and of all withholding of sustenance
or means of life from the enemy; of the appropriation of whatever an
enemy's country affords necessary for the subsistence and safety of the
army, and of such deception as does not involve the breaking of good
faith either positively pledged regarding agreements entered into
during the war cr supposed by the modern law of war to exist. l\fen
who take up arms against one another in public war do not cease on
this account to be moral beings, responsible to one another and to God.
16. l\filitary necessity does not admit of cruelty-that is, the infliction
of suffering for the sake of suffering or for revenge-nor of maiming or
wounding except in fight , nor of torture to extort confessions. It does
not admit of the use of poison i11 any way, nor of the wanton devastation
of a district. It admits of deception, but disclaims acts of perfidy; and,
in general, military necessity does not include any act of hostility which
makes the return to peace unnecessarily difficult.
19. Commanders, whenever admissible, inform the enemy of their
intention to bombard a place, so that the noncombatants, and especially
the women and children, may be removed before the bombardment
commences. But it is no infraction of the common law of " . .ar to omit
thus to inform the enemy; surprise may be a necessity.

It is therefore understood that 1nilitary necessity does
not justify acts \vhieh are forbidden by the la·w·s of \var,
though it may justify acts ordinarily prohibited. J."t is
forbidden to bombard an undefended building, yet if such
a building ce in the line of fire in the bombardment of a
military establishment, its destruction \\. . ould be justified
Discussion at The Hague, 1907.-The discussion at
The Hague, 1907, sho\ved that the proposers of the
exception on the ground of military necessity intended
to make this clause a decided lin1itation upon the action
of the commander:
Le Capitaine de Vaisseau Ottley, au nom de la DP.legation britannique, declare approuver entierement les con~iderations expos8es par
son collegue fran~ais et accepter le texte fan~ais de }'article 2 dans
son entier.
S. Exc. 1\f. Van den Heuv2l expose que le ~e a linea de }'article
2 de la proposition fran9aise lui parait renfermer une disposition d'une
gravitee exceptionnelle.
Le 2e alinea lui semble enlever presque toute l'efficacite de la
protection contenue dans le Jer alinea. II equivaut en effet a dire
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que chaque fois qu'un commandant de forces navale.s se croira presse
par les circonstances, il pourra ne pa~ accorder de clClai; les mots" nece~
sites imperieuses" le rendeut juge de la situation et ceux "d'action
immediate" lui permettent de supprimer tout retard et meme toute
sommation.
Ce systcme pent en trainer tres loin. II s'agit non de villes dCfendues~ mais de villes ouvertes, occupees non par des combattants mais
par des habitants pai~ibles. Il s'agit de permettre de detruire par le
bombardement et d'une manicre soudaine, ::3ans aucun avertissement,
les depots publics et prive~, non seulement les installations propres
au service de la flotte et de l'nrmee, mais aussi les chantien;;;, les ponts,
les gares, etc. Quelle est la ville qui, bombardee clans ces conditions,
ne souffrira pas un dommage incalculable par suite des projectiles
tom bant sur le<;: etabli~sements et les endroits occupes, dans les rues et
accidentellement aussi sur les nombreuses habitations voit'.ines?
L'orateur fait remarquer en terminant que, dans lc comite d'examen,
on n'a rnentionne qu'un seul cas vraiment exceptionnel, celui de la
presence de navires de guerre dans un port non defendu; et on pourrait
permettre dans ce cas: si les necessites n1ilitaires ]'exigent, la destruction immediate par le bombardement de .ces navires. ~his cette
hypothese parti.culiere ne parait pas a la Delegation de Belgique
justifier la disposition generale contenue dans l'alinea 2 de la proposition fran~aise.
Le Capitaine de Yaisseau Lacaze demande a faire bien ressortir que
la proposition fran~aise pose comme regle generale la sommation avec
delai raisonnable; le cas contraire n'est que !'exception. Et l'on ne
saurait croire qu'un commandant de forces navales puisse user de ce
droit exceptionnel en des cas oi1 des "necessites imperieuses" ne l'y
contraindraient pas. Il y a lieu de remarquer d'autre part que d'une
fa~on generale, il ~era procede aux destructions visees par !'article 2,
au moyen d'un materiel special; cc n'est que dans des cas tout a fait
exceptionnels et lorsqu'on ne pourra pas agir autrement qu'on aura
recours a l'emploi du canon qui entraine une perte de temps ('t des
depenses de munitions.
Enfin, le commandant d'une force navale, loin de chercher a procPder
sans n1oderation, aura toujours interet, pour sauvegarder sa responsabilite morale, a effectuer toujours les destructions d'accord avec les
autorites locales et en leur presence. (Deuxieme Conference de la
Paix, Tome III, p. 347.)
S. Exc. l\I. Leon llourgois desirerait ajouter quelques mots, car il ne
lui e~t pas possible de laisser croire que la proposition fran~aise puisse
constituer une aggravation du statu quo. C'est le contraire qui est
la verite. Quelle est en effet la situation? Actuellement, il n'y a
aucune regle protegeant contre le bombardement eventuel des ports,
villEs et villages non defenclus. Cette regle protectrice lnterdisant le
bombardement eHt posee dans le projet de convention: le 1er alinea de
la proposition fran~aife confirme expressement ce principe en edictant
la regle de la sommation et du delai raisonnable pour les exceptions
admise::;. :\Iais la discussion gen6rale a montre que certaines Puis-
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sances ne pouvaient accepter sur ce point une regie absolue s'il n'y
etait apporte une derogation pour certains cas exceptionnels, ceux
notamment de la presence ou de l'arrivee imminente de navires de
guerre ennemis dans le port non defendu. II est bien evident que,
dans le premier cas, le commandant d'une force navale ne pourrait,
sans faillir a son devoir, accorder de delai avant de detruire la force
ennemle et que, dans la Reconde hypothese il peut etre contraint de
proc6der sur le champ a la destruction des ouvrages ut.i.les a l'ennemi
avant son arriv6e.
·
La proposition fran~aise a done pour objet de concilier ces n6ces·
sites 1nilitaires in1perieuses, qui sont !'exception, avec les considerations cl'humanite qui ont dicte la regle gencrale.
En ce faisant, elle contribue a faire about!r une oouvre pratique,
acceptable pour tous, et facilite ainsi la signature d'une convention
qui COnRtituera Un progrAS reel, car elle assurera reellement la protection efficace des villes ouvertes contre le bombardement. (Ibid.,
p. 348.)

Bombardment in Turco- Italian 1rar, 1911-12 .- A case
involving bombardment of ships of \var in an enemy
harbor took place during the 'rurco-Italian War. 1'he
Turkish gunboat Awni-Illa \vas \vith a torpedo boat in
the port of Beirut. Early in the morning these vessels
\vere summoned by the Italians to surrender before
9 o'clock. As no reply \Vas made to the Italian
demand, bombardment \vas begun and the vessels in
the harbor ans\vered the fire. Some of the shells from
the Italian fleet damaged other property, and it \Vas
reported that several persons on shore \Yere killed.
The Turkish authorities protested that this bombardment was contrary to the rules of the Hague convention,
but the protest does not seem to have received much
consideration, and if, as see1ns probable, due notice \Vas
given, there \Vas little ground for the protest. The
Italian account of the reasons for the operation and of
the operation itself, is as follo,vs:
Apres avoir complete en fevrier une premiere organisation defensive
des positions occupees sur la cote de la Lybie, en laissant les batiments
suffisants pour assurer la surveillance du littoral et appuyer eventuellement, de la n1er, les operations entreprises sur terre, la marine tourna
son activhe vers un nouveau theatre d'operations.
La fiotte turque, quoique r6fugiee dans les Dardanelles depuis les
premiers jours de la guerre, n'en repr6sentait pas moins une menace
pour nous. Les nouvelles qu'on en recevait de ten1ps en temps,
amenaient a penser qu'on pouvait regarder comme possible une tentative desesperee de sa part, soit comme represailles, soit comme diver-
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sion destin6e :\ troubler nos operation~ :-l111 Is cote:~ de l' Afrique. La
conformation topographiqne cle.3 COt(':O: de r .A:-:iP dans Ia mer Egee,qui se
prtHait aux embuscacles, donnait a CP.-: iorf'e:-: lla\·ales, par elle-mcme
peu redoubtable~, Ulle Valeur qui n'ctait pas:\ negliger.
Il Pfait clone IICCe.-:saire clP prendre des di~po:'itions pott'r enlever a
la flottc enncmie l'avantage qu'Pll<' pouvait retirer de la configuration
speciale des cote:; sur le th(~atre de Ia mer Eg6<'.
D'autre part, toute af'tion navale pouvant nous procun'r un avantage sur l' en1wmi dpvait ccrtainenwn t a voir un e influence 2onsiderable sur l'is=-uc de la guerrc.
11 fut done d<'>f'ide de tran~portPr nos ion_·p.s tw.vales sur ee theatre
d'operations ct, avant tout, on re.-:olut de debarra~::;er le bassin oriental
de la :Jlediterranee de la presence de deux navires turcs, une ranonniere-cuiras~6e et un torpilleur, qui etaient rc:-:t(>s :\ Beyrouth depuis
le commencement de la guerre.
L'entreprise, confiee par le Contre-amiral Faravelli a la divi~ion
Thaon de Hevel, fut exccut6e le 24 ievrier par le Garibaldi et le
Ferruccio et se termina ·par la dc:-truction complete de.:~ deux navires
ennemis, apres un court mai"' violent combat.
Cette action de detail, conduite avec une grande vigueur et une
admirable precision, se prcte singulierement a mettre en lumiere
l'habilete professionnelle de nos canonniers, deja suffisamment demontree dans les bombardements precedents. Cette habilete s'affirma
d'une manicre toute speciale a Beyrouth, en raison des conditions
particulierement difficiles dans lesquelles se dcroula !'action. Les
deux navires turcs, le torpilleur en. particulier, se trouvaient dissimules
au milieu d'une veritable foret de navires marchands appartenant en
partie a des puissances neutres qui se trouvaient a l'ancre dans l'etroit
bassin interieur d u port.
:Jlalgre cela, le tir de nos vaisseaux fut dirige avec une precision si
grande qu'aucun, des nombreux navires qui entouraient les deux
batiments pris comme cibles n'eut a subir de degats; il en fut de
meme des edifices publics qui, tous epargnes a dessein par nos vaisseaux
ne furent que tres faiblement endommages par les effets indirects du
tir. Cela n'empecha pas, il est vrai, de violentes protestations de
s'elever contre la destruction des deux batiments turcs qui ctait un
acte parfaitement legitime de notre part; d'ailleurs, !'eloquence des
faits ne tarda pas a se faire jour. (La marine dans la guerre ItaloTurque, 1911-12, traduit par Lieut.-Col. ~Iorier, p. 25.)

Bombardment on plea of military necessity. -- \Vhile
su1n1nons nnd reasonable delay is usually required before
bo1nbardn1ent, yet it is granted that sometimes delay
1nay be i1npossible 'vithout undue risk. It is conceivable that a sum1nons and a delay \vould hardly be reasonable if a large fleet of the enen1y \vere in a port 'vhich it
was proposed to bombard.
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Considering all phases of the question, military necessity 'vould justify those measures 'vhich are immediately
"indispensable for securing the ends of the 'var, and
which are la,vful according to the modern la'v and usages
of w·ar.''
Institute of International Law, 1896 .-The Institute of
International La'v at its n1ccting at "'Venice in 1896 considered a body of rules in regard to bombardment prepared by Prof. I-Iolland and Gen. Den Beer Poortugael.
The first article of the conclusions reached "'"as that
"there is no difference bet"~een the rules of the la'v of
war as to bombardment by 1nilitary forces on land and
by naval forces." (.._-\..nnuaire, To1ne X"'V, p. 145 et seq.)
Yet under this principle, bon1bardment 'vas permitted
under article 3 of the propo~ed rules, "in order to obtain
by requisitions or contributions ,,,.hat is necessary for
the fleet." (Ibid.)
Comparison of rules for land and sea.-Article 3 of the
Convention concerning the bombard1nent by naval
forces in ti1ne of "'"ar is as follo,vs:
After explicit notice has been given, the bombardment of undefended ports, towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings may be proceeded
with if the local authorities, after a formal summons has been made to
them, decline to comply with requisitions for the provisions or supplies
necessary for the immediate needs of the naval force before the place
in question. These requisitions shall be in proportion to the resources
of the place. They shall only be demanded in the name of the commander of the said naval force and they shall, as far as possible, be paid
for in cash; if not, they shall be acknowledged by receipts.

The article corresponding to this in tbe La,vs and
Customs for \\Tar on Land is as follo"~s:
ARTICLE 52. Neither requisitions in kind nor services can be demanded from municipalities or inhabitants except for the needs of the
army of occupation. They shall be in proportion to the resources of
the country, and of such a nature as not to involve for the inhabitants
an obligation to take part in the operations of the war against their
own country. These requisitions and services shall be demanded only
on the authority of the commander in the locality occupied.
Contributions in kind shall as far as possible be paid for in cash; if
not, a receipt shall be given and the payment of the amount due shall
be made as soon as possible.

Bombardment for provisions, Hague Conference, 1907.'fhe pro~~osition to allo'v bombardment for failure to fur-
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nish provisions necessary for the fleet rccciYed consideration fro1n Yarious points of Yic\\r. 1~hese "rere sun1marized
in the report of the con1mittec as follo,vs:
L'article 3 statue la seconde exception a !'interdiction contenue
dans !'article l. Bien qu'elle ait figure dans le texte combine, Son
Excellence le Comte Tornielli a tenu a declarer, des le debut de la
discussion, que !'initiative de cette proposition n' etait pas due a la
Delegation italienne. De son cotP, la I lelegation de Belgique a
egalement rcpudie cet article, qu'elle desirerait voir disparaitre tout
entier, sans toutefois formuler une proposition dans ce sens. Aussi
les de bats ne porterent pas sur 1' existence meme de cette exception,
qui, parait-il, a etc considerce comme une concession necessaire aux
besoins de la guerre maritime, les forces navales etant souvent obligees
de se procurer, par voie de requisitions, des vivres et des provisions
dont elles ne sauraient se passer. ~fais on a insistc sur le point de
savoir quelle devrait etre l'etendue des requisitions permises, et dans
ce sens la Delegation espagnole avait demande, au sujet de la proposition des Etats-Unis, qui parlait de requisitions raisonnables, qu'on
precisat quelles sont les requisitions qui doivent etre considerees
comme raisonnables et dont le refus rendrait les villes, etc., passibles
de bombarde1nent. La Delegation d'Espagne proposait en meme
temps que ces requisitions devraient se horner aux fournitures et provisions necessaires, que les navires des Puissances belligcrantes auraient
le droit de se procurer dans un port neutre. De meme, le Yice-Amiral ·
nlehemmed Pacha demanda, au nom de la Delegation ottomane,
l'adjonction d'un alinea specifiant "que le commandant des forces
navales ne devrait pas pouvoir recourir au bombardement s'il etait
prouve que les ports, villes, villages, et habitations en question ne
sont pas en etat de fournir les vivres ou alltres provisions necessaires
aux besoins immcdiats de la force navale presente." Son Excellence
le Comte Tornielli ayant propose de bien preciser que les requisitions
doivent etre "en rapport avec les ressources locales" et son Excellence
~I. le premier delegue de Belgique ayant rappele qu'il y aurait encore
d'autres dispositions, puisees au Reglement sur les lois et coutumes
de }a guerre SUr terre, qui devraiEnt etre appliqw2es aux requisitions,
que pourraient reclamer les forces navales, la commission, tout en ne
s'estimant pas competente de regler ex professo la question des requisitions pour la guerre maritime en general, a decide d'ajouter, a la fin
de !'article 3, une disposition, analogue a celle adoptee deja dans
!'article 52 du Rcglement pcecite, et specifiant que la fourniture de
vivres ou d'approvisionnements dont il s'agit doit, non seulement
correspondre aux necessites des besoins du moment de la force navale
presente, mais encore etre en rapport avec les ressources de la localite;
ces requisitions ne seront reclamces qu'avec l'autorisation du commandant de la dite force navale; elles seront autant que possible
payees au comptant; sinon, elles seront constatees par des re~us.
(Deuxieme Conference de la Paix, Tome I, p. 115.)
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Bombardment for supplies.-Article 3 of the convention
concerning bom.b ardment by naval forces is:
After explicit notice has been given, the bombardment of undefended
ports, towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings may be proceeded with
if the local authorities, after a formal sum1nons has been made to them,
decline to comply with requisitions for the provisions or supplies necessary for the immediate needs of the naval force before the place in
question. These requisitions shall be in proportion to the resources of
the place. They shall only be den1anded in the name of the commander of the said naval force, and they shall, as far as possible, be paid
for in cash; if not, they shall be acknowledged by receipts.

This article "~as not approved by all at the conference
at The Hague in 1907, and since that time seems to have
been received 'vith less and less favor.
Many have argued that such an article "'"ould not be
necessary, but that necessary supplies might be obtained
'vithout such extreme measures.
Some see in the provision that ''requisitions shall be
in proportion to the resources of the place,'' a source of
controversy o'ving to the difficulty under w-hich a na\al
commander ""'"ould be in determining the resources.
The demand 'vould to some see1n questionable fron1 the
point of vie'v of policy because a confession of the needs
to 'vhich the fleet had been reduced.
Further, as the tow. n is undefended a force n1igh t land,
and 'vould then co1ne under the ordinary rules of land
warfare in regard to requisitions "~hich 'vould be in so1ne
respects more favorable to the party n1aking the requisition.
General character of req_uisitions.-In land 'varfare,
requisitions may be for provisions, supplies, or articles
needed for the use of the army. Beasts of burden, carts,
raihvay material, boats for use of the ar1ny, and other
means of transportation n1ay be demanded. Si1nilarly,
services of the inhabitants for nonnulitary· ,york may be
required.
In naval 'varfare, if requisitions are allo,ved, corresponding articles and services may be den1anded. It "~ould be
possible to require that supplies needed for the support
of the personnel of the ship, fuel for the use of its engines,
or other articles necessary for immediate use be furnished.
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There is the condition that these requisitions ho in proportion to the resources of the place. As it n1ay bo
presumed that a naYnl force dctnanding supplies or
making requisitions is often under pressure on account of
lack of time, tho transportation of the supplies to a convenient point n1ight reasonably be required if tho resources
of the plnce pern1itted. 'fhe gathering and transportation of tho supplies to the ships 1night be eyon Inore
essential than corresponding serYice for land forces, as the
land forces "-ould ordinarily haYo equipment better
adapted for such purposes.
Conclusion.-The transportation of the supplics, if
'vithi.n tho resources of the place, "-ould come w·ithin the
lin1its of the requisition.
Institute oj· International Lau,, 1913.-Tho co1nn1ittee
of tho Institute did not, in presenting a nltUlual for nlaritime ".,.arfare, propose many changes in tho Hague coin""cntion concerning bo1nbanhnent. There ".,.ere sotne "-ho
proposed to eliminate article 31 of tho proposed 1nanual
which corresponded to article 3 of the Hague con\ention.
There w·as considerable discussion in tho comn1ittee upon
the subject, and this is suininarized in the report as
follo,vs:
Un membre de l'Institut de Droit International, :JL Kebedgy, dans
une proposition dont il a ete donne connaissance a la comnlission,
avait dernande la suppression de !'article 31 autorisant le bombardement des localites et des batirnents non defendus pour refus d'obtemperer a des requisitions de vivres OU d'approYisionnements: "Il ne sied
pas, disait-il, a une societe savante conuue l'Institut, poursuivant la
'civilisation de la guerre' de consacrer fonnellernent un tel abus de la
force." ~I. Strisower, au sein de la COBlnlission, s'est de rneine declare
hostile a cette disposition; il n'a pas ete, toutefois, comme 11. Kebedgy,
jusqu'a en reclamer le retranchement du projet; il a propose seulement
de la modifier en ce sens qu'il ne faudrait reconnaitre au commandant
le droit de bombarder que si, apres reception de refus par les autorites
locale3, il a employe tous les moyens en son pouvoir pour prendre ce qu'il veut requisitionner et qu'on lui refuse. ~I. Edourd Rolin
Jaequen1ynsa fait observer que cette exigence ne changerait pas grand'chose: "elle ne ferait qu'ajouter une formalite de plus." La commission a estime que, liee par les regles directrices votees a Christiania,
elle ne pouvait faire droit ala dernande de ~I. Kebedgy qui supprimait
un article admis, non seulement par la Convention de LaHaye No. IX,
du 18 octobre 1907, mais par l'Institut lui-n1erne dans son Reglement
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de 1896 sur le bombardement des vl.lles ouvertes par des forces navales
(art. 4); maiA, a !'instigation de M. Paul Fauchille, elle a decide, pour
donner satisfaction a M. Strisower, d'ajouter dans la disposition, afin
d'en attenuer la rigueur, a pres les mot"3: "Il peut, a pres notification
expresse," les mots: "et si aucun autre moyen n'est pos"3ible." (26,
Annuaire de l~Institut de Droit International, p. 237 .)

With this change the article came before the Institute
at the Oxford meeting, and it was voted to suppress the
whole article 'vhich corrPsponded in some respects to
article 3 of the Hague convention.
The form of the article upon which the vote 'vas taken
was as follo,vs:
ART. 30. Il peut, apres notification expresse, et si aucun autre
moyen n'est possible, etre procede au bombardement des portf', vllles,
villages, habitations ou batiments non defend us, si les autorites locales,
mises en demeure par une sommation formelle, refusent d'obtemperer
a des requisitions de vivres ou d'approvisionneinents necessaires au
besoin present de la force navale qui se trouve devant la localite.
Ces requisitions seront en rapport avec les ressources de la localite.
Elles ne seront reclan1ees qu'avec l'autorisation du commandant de la
dite force navale et elles seront, autant que possible, payees au cmnptant; sinon elles seront constatees par des rec;us.

It will be seen that this article differs from article 3 of
the Hague convention on bombardment by the introduction of the clause "et si aucun autre moyen n'est possible,"
which 'vould make it to read:
After explicit notice, and if no other way is possibl0, the bombardment of undefended ports, towns, villages, dwellings, buildings
may be proceeded with, etc.

In this form sorne thought it 'vould be useless to
retain the article t ecause the restriction, "if no other
way is possible," 'vould nullify in practice '"·hat seemed
to he a grant and that such a regulation should not be
approved Ly a cody of jurists 'vho should endeavor to
n1ake clear the regulu.tiors. Corsequently son1e voted
against the article 1 ecause they 'vere opposed to bombardnlent for requisitiors and others opposed it because
of its modified form, 'vhich made it in effect a prohibition if strictly orserverl.. Under such conditions 31
voted to reject the article, 23 voted to retain, and 2 did
not vote.
71396-15-7*
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If these rules of the Institute are adopted, therefore,
it "·ould be necessary under ordinary conditions to land
forces in order to ohtain supplies or provisions under
requisitions "·hich could then l:e made according to the
rules of laiHl "·arfare. The locality 'Yould in either case
be obliged to furnish the supplies. The na\al commander "·oulcl be con1pelled to use a soine,\·ha t clifferen t
method to obtain co1npliance "·i th his clernnncls. 1\.rticle
3 as en1hodied in the con\ention of The Hague is so surrounded "·ith restrictions as to n1ake it of little real \alue
as a permissive regulation -e. g. there n1ust be for1nal
sum1nons to the local authorities, the supplies n1ust l'e to
meet imn1edia te needs, in propor6on to the resources of
the place, de1nanded in 1uune of conunander, paid for or
acknow-ledged by receipt, etc.-procedure in\ol\ing al)out
as many difficulties as actual landing nnd requisition
under land rules.
It is thought by nutny that the pern1ission "·oulcl rarely
if ever l~e of \alue to States having considerable navies
and carryi11 g on ,·rar in ci\ilized n1anner "·hile the retention of the article 1night give less stable States a ground
for extren1e action in some instances and encouragement
to prey on a stronger ene1ny. Others think the article
might gi\e sanction to an act ,,·hich 1night ce necessary
under estren1e conditions.
If the regJlations in regard to requisitions in land
'varfnre are to l;e ret;tinecl, this regulation of article 3 of
the llague convention see1ns to re fairly in accord 'vith
the la"·s and custo1ns of "'"ar on land.
The \Ote on the subject at the Oxford meeting of the
institute in 1913 "·hile against retaining the article
embodying the principle of article 3, as so1ne"·ha t differently stated, "'"as in a ra.tio less than 3 to 2.
Considering the matter from nll points of vie"·, article 3
of the Hague convention concerning bon1bardment by
na \al forces is one upon "·hich there seems to be a "·ellgrounded difference of opinion "·hich should be given
further consideration.
OoncZ.usion.-(a) Paragraph 2 of article 1 should not be
accepted in its present form.
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(b) Under the present rules in regnrd to con-version,
the presence in a belligerent port of vessels \vhich are
suited for conversion into vessels of \vnr mny be a su-fficient ground for bombnrdment unless satisfactory
arrangements are made to guarantee that these vessels
shall not be used for '''"ar purposes.
(c) l\:filitary necessity under paragraph 3 of article 2
applies to actions immediately "indispensable for securing the ends of the \Var, and " rhieh are la·wful nc~ordjng
to modern ht\V and usages of 'var" and not of a nature
"to rnake the return to peace unnecessarily difficult."
(d) Unless the \vhole of Convention IX is revised,
article 3 in regard to requisitions by naval forces should
be retained.

